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Unity of the Graveyard and the Attack on 
Constitutional Secularism 
Steven G. Gey.∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, certain aspects of the Supreme Court’s Religion 
Clause jurisprudence have taken on the appearance of a quest for 
religious unity. This quest for unity has assumed various forms, but 
has been most prominent in the theme of neutrality that has come to 
dominate the Court’s jurisprudence regarding government financing 
of religious enterprises.1 The quest for unity has been an 
undercurrent of the Court’s recent paeans to neutrality in two 
different but related senses. First, a majority of the Court has 
pursued unity in the sense of doctrinal uniformity—i.e., the desire to 
develop a uniform constitutional standard that can be applied in a 
way that does not exclude religious groups and individuals from 
competing for political largess alongside every other interest group 
that operates in the larger political culture.2 Second, and perhaps 
∗ David and Deborah Fonvielle and Donald and Janet Hinkle Professor of Law, Florida 
State University College of Law. J.D., Columbia University, 1982; B.A., Eckerd University, 
1978. 
 1. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). The Zelman majority held:  
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides 
assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to 
religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private 
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment 
Clause. 
Id. at 652. 
 2. See id. (upholding a Cleveland, Ohio, school voucher program under which students 
were given government vouchers to attend private schools, most of which were religious, on 
the ground that the program provided neutral assistance to parents without regard to their 
choice of religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding a federal 
program under which funds were distributed to religious schools to purchase educational 
materials on the ground that the program was neutral with regard to religious and secular 
schools). 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004), is not 
inconsistent with the point made in the text. In Locke, the Court upheld the State of 
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more perniciously, some members of the Court have pursued unity 
by encouraging the use of religion as a unifying cultural force. This is 
the sense of unity in which Justice Scalia once remarked that 
“nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious 
believers of various faiths a toleration—no, an affection—for one 
another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God 
whom they all worship and seek.”3 At the outer extreme, this sense 
of religious unity leads to the conclusion that being religious and 
being American are one and the same thing. Recall Justice Douglas’s 
famous quip that “[w]e are a [country] whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being.”4 
This Article critiques and responds to the recent quest for 
political unity through religion. The premise of this Article is that 
the quest for unity through religion will inevitably fail because, in a 
Washington’s denial of state scholarship money to any student pursuing a degree in devotional 
theology. Id. at 1309. The State interpreted its scholarship program in this way to avoid 
violating a state constitutional prohibition on providing state funds to “any religious worship, 
exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 
11. The United States Supreme Court held by a 7–2 vote that this action did not violate a 
theology student’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1315. The Court concluded that the case 
involved the “play in the joints” between what the Establishment Clause permits the states to 
do to aid or advance religion and what the Free Exercise Clause requires them to do to protect 
the religious exercise of citizens. Id. at 1311 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 
669 (1970)). The Court said nothing in Locke that would undermine previous decisions 
permitting states to provide significant financing to religious institutions through voucher 
programs; in fact, the Court specifically reaffirmed pertinent decisions such as Zelman. Id. at 
1311–12. With regard to the issues discussed in the text, Locke therefore leaves the landscape 
exactly as it was coming into the case. Thus, under the Court’s theory of neutrality as 
articulated and applied in decisions such as Zelman, religious groups may use their political 
power to gain access to state funds, and the government may base its allocation of social-
service and educational funds to religious groups on the government’s perception of religion’s 
special benefits to program beneficiaries. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607 (1988) 
(“Nothing in our previous cases prevents Congress from making such a judgment or from 
recognizing the important part that religion or religious organizations may play in resolving 
certain secular problems.”). 
 3. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing against a theory of 
“rigid separation” of church and state and asserting that the Establishment Clause “d[oes] not 
require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor d[oes] it prohibit the 
Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion”); Marsh v. Chambers, 
463 U.S. 783, 786, 792 (1983) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to officially 
sanctioned legislative prayer, noting that such prayers are “deeply embedded in the history and 
tradition of this country,” and concluding that they are “simply a tolerable acknowledgement 
of beliefs widely held among the people of this country”). 
 4. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
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religiously pluralistic country, no one religion will be capable of 
mustering the necessary support among the country’s diverse 
population around a common set of ultimate goals or ideals. The 
quest for religious unity therefore will inevitably degenerate into 
sectarian factionalism and political ostracism for those who refuse to 
climb onto the majority’s religious bandwagon. A more fruitful path 
to political unity requires a secular constitutional framework in which 
all approaches to the subject of religion and politics may thrive 
simultaneously. The outline and justification for such a framework is 
provided below. Specifically, Sections IV and V outline an affirmative 
and a negative case for constitutional secularism, respectively. The 
affirmative case for constitutional secularism asserts that there is 
positive value in a secular democratic system in which religious and 
nonreligious citizens may participate in political decision making on 
equal terms as long as they recognize certain rights and protections 
of those whose basic values conflict with their own. The negative 
case is simply a reminder of the Hobbesian axiom that conceding the 
authority to impose religious values on the entire society is preferable 
to the prospect of a war of all against all for sectarian dominance of 
political power. Under either the affirmative or negative justification, 
the Constitution should be read to guarantee a secular government 
in which religion may not be used as the focal point for national 
unity. 
II. THE QUEST FOR RELIGIOUS UNITY 
Currently, the approach suggested in this Article seems to cut 
against the dominant tendencies of the broader culture. The 
Supreme Court is not alone in its quest for public unity through 
religion. The Court has been joined on this quest by many 
prominent political figures, some of whom have few reservations 
about publicly expressing their deep religious devotion. For example, 
the country is currently being led by a president who proudly 
announced during a political debate that his favorite philosopher is 
Jesus Christ.5 This president does not merely give lip service to his 
religion; President Bush’s religious zeal regularly filters into his 
 5. Frank Bruni, Bush Tangles with McCain over Campaign Financing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 1999, at A1 (reporting that during a Republican Party primary debate the candidates 
were asked to name their favorite “philosopher-thinker[],” to which Bush responded, “Christ, 
because he changed my heart”). 
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administration’s political policies. Among other things, he has 
created a special office within the executive branch with the single 
purpose of increasing government interaction with religious social-
service groups as part of “the Federal Government’s comprehensive 
effort to enlist, equip, enable, empower, and expand the work of 
faith-based and other community organizations to the extent 
permitted by law.”6 On a more dangerous plane, the President has 
the tendency to equate his foreign policy initiatives with God’s 
divine plan, as when he quoted the prophet Isaiah in announcing 
(perhaps prematurely) the American military victory in Iraq.7 These 
religious-policy overtones have generated relatively little negative 
comment domestically, although they are frequently criticized 
abroad. American soldiers “are no longer simply killing enemies,” 
one British commentator noted dryly about Bush’s sense of engaging 
on a religious crusade, “they are casting out demons.”8 
The President is by no means alone on this score, however. 
Members of the legislative branch are equally anxious to publicize 
their righteousness as widely as possible, and sanctimony often melds 
with aggressive patriotism as the legislative gloss on the theme of 
national unity. In response to the now notorious Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision regarding the Pledge of Allegiance,9 a 
 6. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001) (creating the 
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives). 
 7. See, e.g., George Monbiot, America Is a Religion: U.S. Leaders Now See Themselves 
As Priests of a Divine Mission to Rid the World of Its Demons, THE GUARDIAN (London), July 
29, 2003, at 19 (“Wherever you go, you carry a message of hope—a message that is ancient 
and ever new. In the words of the prophet Isaiah, ‘To the captives, come out, and to those in 
darkness, be free.’” (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting President George W. 
Bush’s comment to troops)). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Elk 
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). Although the issue discussed in 
this Article is at the heart of the dispute in Newdow, all of the Supreme Court justices avoided 
confronting the matter in their opinions reversing the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of Mr. 
Newdow. The majority reversed the Ninth’s Circuit ruling on the basis of standing, holding 
that although Mr. Newdow had a constitutionally sufficient injury, he failed to meet the 
Court’s “prudential” grounds for standing. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2313. Essentially, the 
majority deferred to the California courts’ determination that the mother of Mr. Newdow’s 
daughter had sole custody, holding that this determination gave the mother exclusive authority 
to decide whether a lawsuit should be brought to enforce the daughter’s rights under the 
Establishment Clause. There is a serious question as to whether this holding accurately 
represents the implications of the California courts’ custody rulings, and also whether this 
holding misrepresents Mr. Newdow’s own claims. See id. at 2316 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring) (noting that that Mr. Newdow was suing on his own—not his daughter’s—
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unanimous Senate10 and all but three lonely members of the House 
of Representatives11 quickly voted to denounce the court and 
reaffirm that we are indeed a nation “under God.” 
This quest for unity has taken on particular force since the 
attacks of September 11. Since that sad day, many have discussed the 
unifying effect of religion. Even legal academics have joined the 
parade. In the academic literature, religion has been brought front 
and center into the public square and noted as a justifiable rallying 
point of a nation quite literally under attack. One prominent 
example of this tendency is William Marshall’s recent article 
exploring the use of religion in times of crisis.12 Marshall notes the 
many problems of injecting religion into the government’s responses 
to such crises: “Because both state and religion are at their most 
influential point in times of crisis, the dangers in church-state concert 
behalf). Whatever the merits of the Court’s reasoning, the practical effect of its standing 
approach to the decision allowed the Newdow majority to avoid addressing the religious-unity 
issue altogether. 
The concurring opinions also avoided grappling with this issue. Justice O’Connor 
produced an opinion in which she argued that the religious component of the Pledge should 
be upheld because its meaning is constitutionally insignificant. To use Justice O’Connor’s 
words, the phrase “under God” “qualifies as a minimal reference to religion,” which could be 
easily avoided by those saying the Pledge. Therefore, the phrase did not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation. Id. at 2326 (O’Connor, J., concurring). By draining all religious 
significance out of the phrase “under God,” Justice O’Connor avoided having to confront the 
more difficult issue of whether the government could enlist real, as opposed to de minimis, 
religious reference as a unifying force. A second concurring opinion by Justice Thomas focused 
on the issue of whether the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause should be incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and therefore applied to the states. Id. 
at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring). Since he concluded that the answer to this question should 
be “no,” Justice Thomas also avoided having to grapple with the legitimacy of religious unity 
under the Establishment Clause. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). The third concurring opinion, 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, comes closest to dealing with the religious-unity issue, but instead 
of directly confronting the implications of embracing religion as a unifying force, the Chief 
Justice chose to dismiss the religious component of the Pledge as little more than a 
“descriptive phrase” referring to the country’s religious heritage. See id. at 2320 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring). Like Justice O’Connor, the Chief Justice essentially robbed the religious 
component of the Pledge of so much meaning that he rendered the religious-unity issue 
irrelevant. 
 10. S. Res. 292, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. S6105 (daily ed. June 26, 2002) 
(recording the Senate vote of 99–0). 
 11. H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. H4135 (daily ed. June 27, 2002) 
(recording the House of Representatives vote of 416–3). 
 12. William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments 
of National Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11 (2002). 
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are at their highest.”13 But Marshall eventually concedes that the 
conjoining of church and state will occur during such episodes 
without regard to constitutional reservations, and thus he seeks only 
to limit the scope and intensity of the joinder by suggesting 
“something like an exceptional circumstances test that would require 
a number of factors—such as a national crisis and public mourning 
combined with a limited temporal nexus between the precipitating 
event and the state response—in order to sustain a state-supported 
religious exercise.”14 
This wave of support for religious unity—in times of crisis and 
otherwise—is often coupled with an attack on a perceived secularist 
bent in much of the Supreme Court’s modern First Amendment 
church-state jurisprudence.15 Proponents of the religious unity 
position argue that constitutional secularism is not only inconsistent 
with the country’s pervasively religious culture and history, but also 
with the needs of modern governments, which provide a broad range 
of social services touching nearly every aspect of life. This is the 
essence of Michael McConnell’s contention that “the idea of 
‘separation between church and state’ is either meaningless, or 
(worse) is a prescription for secularization of areas of life that are 
properly pluralistic.”16 Proponents of religious unity add that in the 
absence of religion and other mediating institutions, the framework 
of democratic government will be nothing but an empty shell, 
devoid of the moral center needed to keep the entire machine 
running properly. In McConnell’s words, churches provide an 
important mechanism “by which the citizens in a liberal polity learn 
to transcend their individual interests and opinions and . . . develop 
civic responsibility.”17 Religion allegedly fills that gap by generating a 
core set of values that can serve as a unifying force and provide a 
stable and enduring cornerstone to anchor the country’s political 
structure during the ideological storms produced by a multitude of 
more mundane and ephemeral policy disputes. 
 13. Id. at 29. 
 14. Id. at 31–32. 
 15. For examples of criticism of the secularist orientation of modern Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, see infra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 16. Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons To Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments 
Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 640–41. 
 17. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 17. 
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All of this is problematic for the simple reason that it will not 
work. National unity will not occur within a religious framework. In 
fact, the religious framework is peculiarly unsuited to the quest for 
unity because the very design of that framework is configured around 
notions of inclusion and exclusion. The religious framework is 
designed to thwart efforts at unity by making demands on believers 
that are specifically intended to ensure their inclusion into the holy 
precincts of the faith. But those same standards for inclusion are also 
standards for exclusion of nonadherents, and any religion of 
substance will define itself in part by reference to those who do not 
meet the standards of the creed. 
Once one concedes that a political structure defined by religious 
principles will exclude those who do not choose to adopt those 
principles, there is little left in the search for unity through religion. 
If cultural and political unity is a desirable goal, we must search for a 
secular alternative to the religious-unity model. I sketch the outlines 
of two such secular options below. One, which I will term the 
affirmative case for constitutional secularism, takes as its starting 
point the essential functions of a democracy and uses those essential 
functions as the lodestar for political unity. The second, darker 
model, which I will term the negative case for constitutional 
secularism, is based on the recognition that the very factors that 
make religion exclusive and disunifying are also the factors that can 
lead diverse groups of religious adherents to give up their quest for 
unity through dominance in exchange for a guarantee of survival. 
After exploring in more detail the nature of religious exclusivity, I 
will turn to a fuller explanation of the two options for achieving 
real—that is, secular—national unity. 
III. THE FALSE UNITY OF SECTARIANISM 
Religion is by its very nature exclusionary, which means that 
religion is incapable of producing the unity sought by the 
proponents of a more overtly religious political culture. This is not a 
unique or novel observation; a recognition of the messy disunity of 
religious life is at the heart of Madison’s and Jefferson’s 
separationism,18 as well as the Court’s modern Establishment Clause 
 18. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE 
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 251–52 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
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jurisprudence—at least since Everson v. Board of Education, in which 
the Court incorporated the Establishment Clause into the 
Fourteenth Amendment.19 To Madison and Jefferson, governmental 
attempts to force religious unity were doomed to fail or, at best, 
would achieve only a hypocritical and superficial conformity. In 
Madison’s terms, such ecclesiastical establishments “erect a spiritual 
tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority.”20 Yet the recent scholarship 
discussed above,21 and some of what the Court itself has said recently 
(at least in the religious-financing cases),22 is deeply contrary to what 
used to be commonplace among First Amendment church-state 
jurisprudence. It is therefore worth exploring this matter briefly. 
As to the nature of religion, any religion whose precepts are not 
so diluted, generalized, and generic that they are acceptable to the 
entire world will be defined by standards that have as their purpose 
and effect the inclusion of adherents and the exclusion of 
nonadherents. Religion often consists of a set of exclusionary 
dichotomies: good and evil, heaven and hell, sinner and saint, 
believer and infidel, God and mammon.23 All of the important 
distinctions that define what we know as religion are distinctions that 
have the basic purpose of keeping the faith pure by excluding those 
[T]hat the impious presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as 
ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed 
dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own opinions and modes of 
thinking as the only true and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on 
others, hath established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the 
world and through all time . . . . 
Id.; see also James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (“Rulers 
who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have found an established clergy convenient 
auxiliaries. A just government, instituted to secure [and] perpetuate it, needs them not.”), 
quoted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 68 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 19. 330 U.S. 1, 10–11, 16 (1947) (noting that efforts to force religious unification on 
the country—in particular, the forced payment of tithes—“shock[ed] the freedom-loving 
colonials into a feeling of abhorrence,” which led to the adoption of the anti-establishment 
principle that “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate 
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa”). 
 20. Madison, supra note 18, quoted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 68. 
 21. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 22. See supra note 2. 
 23. This description applies to a wide variety of faiths that are politically powerful in the 
modern United States, including traditional Western faiths such as Christianity and Judaism, as 
well as Islam and even Hinduism. It would not apply to some Eastern faiths, such as 
Buddhism, which comprise a small fraction of the current population of the United States and 
which do not require the existence of gods or devils and do not necessarily include concepts of 
heaven and hell. 
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who do not meet the high standard of the faithful. The notion of 
unity makes sense in a religious context only from the internal 
perspective of those who follow God’s word. Religion does not seek 
to unify the religious and the nonreligious because to do so would 
corrupt the entire enterprise. In contrast, the goal of political unity is 
to develop a mechanism to unify the members of a diverse 
population who are motivated by wildly different senses of the 
ultimate good. In this sense, not only is political unity not religion’s 
goal, it is actually antithetical to religion’s entire reason for existing. 
Religion offers the prospect for unity only in the sense of joining 
together to celebrate the accepted faith. In other words, religion 
offers unity only for those who convert. 
Proponents of religious unity offer an image of a devout nation 
joining hands in a benign collective exercise of national prayer and 
obeisance to a unifying God. However, this inclusive image does not 
reflect the more nuanced and sometimes troubling nature of the 
collective American religious experience. Religion has not been a 
consistently unifying force in this country. Just as often, it has been 
the source of division and strife. Even before the founding of the 
Republic, the infusion of religion into politics was characterized by 
factionalism and internecine conflict. Stories of battles over early 
forms of establishment are legion.24 The Virginia dispute over Patrick 
Henry’s religious-establishment proposal is itself a good case study of 
the difficulties in achieving significant unity even among groups of 
Christians whose doctrinal dissimilarities are not nearly as extreme as 
the disputes among conflicting faiths in the modern world.25 
 24. Tocqueville recounts, for example, seventeenth-century Connecticut laws mandating 
attendance at state-sanctioned religious services and Massachusetts laws banishing Anabaptists, 
imposing the death penalty on any Catholic priest who returned to the state after being exiled, 
and charging severe fines against ship captains bringing Quakers to the colony (plus 
imprisoning and beating those Quakers who managed to come anyway). ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 42–43 nn.26–27 (George Lawrence trans., Anchor 
Books 1969) (1848). For a general account of more recent debates over religious 
establishments in the early states, see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: 
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). 
 25. Henry proposed to revive the state-mandated payment of tithes for the support of 
religion. The details of the dispute are recounted in the various opinions in Everson. See, e.g., 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1947); id. at 35–39 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
Dissention within Christian denominations over the wisdom of the state-mandated assessment 
was one of the most important reasons the assessment bill was defeated. See LEVY, supra note 
24, at 58 (noting that by the end of the debate “only the Episcopal Church and the 
Methodists continued to endorse the general assessment”). 
4GEY-FIN 10/13/2004 7:33 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2004 
1014 
 
The strange thing about the modern debate over these issues is 
how proponents of religious politics use this history of religious 
conflict to reach precisely the opposite conclusion from that reached 
by Madison. For example, Justice Thomas appropriately recounts the 
hostility directed toward Catholics during the nineteenth century,26 
but draws a counterintuitive conclusion from that history, namely, 
that the Court should lower Establishment Clause restrictions on 
links between church and state.27 As would be demonstrated by a 
more complete rendition of the historical conflict cited by Justice 
Thomas, religious dominance of government is the problem, not the 
solution.28 
There are two possible explanations for this tendency to use the 
history of politicized religious conflict to argue in favor of increasing 
religious influence over modern politics. Both of these explanations 
are unflattering to the proponents of religious unity. The first 
possible explanation is that the various dominant sects have decided 
to profit on a short-term basis from access to government funds to 
which they were all previously barred. This short-term marriage of 
convenience simply delays the inevitable battle for ultimate 
dominance between the various religious beneficiaries of government 
largesse.29 
 26. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000) (plurality opinion) (arguing 
that opposition to state financing of private schools has a “shameful pedigree” in that it is 
based on a history of anti-Catholic prejudice). 
 27. Justice Thomas discusses the Blaine Amendment and other efforts to forestall the 
use of state money to finance private religious schools, but he ignores the historical 
circumstances that made these private schools necessary in the first place. Catholic private 
schools were formed in large part to escape Protestant dominance of the public school system, 
which manifested itself in overt efforts to proselytize—or, failing that, to ostracize or to 
pressure into submission—Catholic children. The Protestant-controlled public schools were 
infused with the dominant faith and its religious practices, including religious exercises based 
on the Protestant Bible, and recalcitrant Catholic children were expelled, sometimes beaten, 
and generally coerced to conform. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History 
of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300 (2001). It is no answer to suggest 
that the modern versions of religious-unity arguments are different because they are more 
ecumenical. As usual, Madison provided a succinct response to this argument: “Who does not 
see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, 
may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other 
Sects?” Madison, supra note 18, quoted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 65. 
 28. Madison, supra note 18, quoted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 65. 
 29. The fear that permitting the government to favor religion generically will lead to a 
battle of sect versus sect for dominance is hardly a new or novel idea. As noted previously, 
Madison expressed this very concern in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments.: 
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The other possible explanation is that a seismic shift has occurred 
in the way the various mainstream Christian (and even some 
Orthodox Jewish) sects have decided to approach the issue of 
sectarian conflict. Prior to the modern era, the main cause of 
religious conflict was the effort of each sect to dominate competing 
sects that were products of the same cultural matrix. Disputes 
between, for example, Protestants and Catholics were hostile and 
even violent, but the two factions at least shared a common 
understanding of the religious and political culture in which they 
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in 
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect 
of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can 
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any 
one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases 
whatsoever? 
Id., quoted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 65–66. The concern has not gone away in the modern era. 
In the recent litigation over the constitutionality of government vouchers for religious schools, 
both Justice Souter and Justice Breyer raised the concern of religious divisiveness and the fear 
of sectarian battles for dominance in the competition for government funding. Justice Souter 
noted: 
  Increased voucher spending is not, however, the sole portent of growing 
regulation of religious practice in the school, for state mandates to moderate 
religious teaching may well be the most obvious response to the third concern 
behind the ban on establishment, its inextricable link with social conflict. . . . As 
appropriations for religious subsidy rise, competition for the money will tap sectarian 
religion’s capacity for discord. “Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, 
educational or other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect 
against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by numbers alone will benefit 
most, there another.”  
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 715 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)). 
Justice Breyer expressed similar concerns: 
  Under these modern-day circumstances, how is the “equal opportunity” 
principle to work—without risking the “struggle of sect against sect” against which 
Justice Rutledge warned? School voucher programs finance the religious education 
of the young. And, if widely adopted, they may well provide billions of dollars that 
will do so. Why will different religions not become concerned about, and seek to 
influence, the criteria used to channel this money to religious schools? Why will they 
not want to examine the implementation of the programs that provide this money—
to determine, for example, whether implementation has biased a program toward or 
against particular sects, or whether recipient religious schools are adequately 
fulfilling a program’s criteria? If so, just how is the State to resolve the resulting 
controversies without provoking legitimate fears of the kinds of religious favoritism 
that, in so religiously diverse a Nation, threaten social dissension? 
Id. at 723–24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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both arose.30 The antagonists may have disputed, for example, the 
authority of the Pope, but neither faction disputed the authority of 
God. 
In the modern world—or at least in the modern industrialized 
world—this common understanding is much more tenuous. Two 
different phenomena have undermined the framework in which 
religions operate in the West. The first is the rise of cultural (as 
opposed to political) secularism. In blunt terms, the influence of 
traditional religion in the Western world is rapidly diminishing. 
Based on current trends, the practice of traditional Western religion 
may soon become the exclusive franchise of the United States and 
parts of the third world. One could make a good case for the 
proposition that in Western Europe religion is already largely 
irrelevant to the culture and that religion’s influence over the way 
people live their daily lives is already de minimis. A recent New York 
Times analysis depicts the bleak prospects of religion in Europe. 31 
According to one recent comprehensive study of European culture, 
only twenty-one percent of Europeans said religion was “very 
important” to them.32 Church attendance rates of Europeans also 
reflect the diminishing significance of religion. In Italy—one of the 
more religious Western European nations—the percentage of the 
population who regularly attend church is reported to be as low as 
fifteen percent.33 The Times reporter summarizes the reality of 
 30. After recounting the history of hostility to Catholicism in the early American 
colonies, see supra note 24, Tocqueville goes on to note the political confluence of Christian 
sects during the early years of the Republic: 
I have seen no country in which Christianity is less clothed in forms, symbols, and 
observances than it is in the United States, or where the mind is fed with clearer, 
simpler, or more comprehensive conceptions. Though American Christians are 
divided into very many sects, they all see their religion in the same light. This is true 
of Roman Catholics as well as other beliefs. Nowhere else do Catholic priests show 
so little taste for petty individual observances, for extraordinary and peculiar ways to 
salvation, and nowhere else do they care so much for the spirit and so little for the 
letter of the law. 
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 24, at 448–49. 
 31. See Frank Bruni, Faith Fades Where it Once Burned Strong, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2003, at A1 (citing LOEK HALMAN, EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY FOUNDATION, THE 
EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY: A THIRD WAVE (2001), available at http://spitswww.uvt.nl/ 
web/fsw/evs/documents/evs_sourcebook.pdf).  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. This observation is particularly telling in that the study also indicates that eighty-
five percent of Italians identify themselves as Roman Catholic, and thirty-three percent describe 
religion as “very important.” Id. 
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religion in Europe by noting that “Europe already seems more and 
more like a series of tourist-trod monuments to Christianity’s past” 
and by further noting that the “withering of the Christian faith in 
Europe” has effectively shifted the religion’s center of gravity to the 
Southern Hemisphere.34 
This phenomenon cannot have escaped the attention of the 
mainstream religious denominations in the United States.35 If the 
main task of previous generations of religious leaders was to find 
ways to convert the adherents of other sects who already shared their 
basic beliefs, the main task of today’s religious leaders is to keep the 
entire religious enterprise alive in the face of evidence that much of 
the Western world just does not care. Thus, it is not surprising in the 
United States to see agreement over issues such as government 
financing of religion among sects that only a few decades ago were 
theologically hostile to each other. All such sects are currently under 
siege on the Western front; the main battle today is not between 
Catholicism and Protestantism, but between religion and cultural 
secularism. 
The battle to contain the damage inflicted by secularism on the 
Western front is only one of Western religion’s problems. Western 
religion’s other battle is on the Eastern front, where Western 
religion’s dominance is threatened by a radical and thoroughly 
unaccommodating version of Islam. Unlike the battle against cultural 
secularism, this battle is not a new one on the global stage, but it is a 
novelty to be fighting this battle domestically as well as in foreign 
lands. Islam is one of the fastest growing faiths in the United 
States,36 and even if the numerical dominance of Christians ensures 
 34. Id. 
 35. The United States is not immune from the secularization trend, although that trend 
is less advanced in the United States than in Western Europe. In the United States, although 
ninety-one percent of the population declares some religious affiliation, only forty-four percent 
report regularly attending a church or synagogue. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Chart No. 80: 
Religious Preference, Church Membership, and Attendance: 1980 to 2002, in STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 67 (2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2004pubs/03statab/pop.pdf. 
 36. According to one survey, the number of individuals identifying themselves as 
Muslim grew 209% from 1990 to 2001. Barry A. Kosmin et al., American Religious 
Identification Survey, Exhibit 1 (2001), at http://www.gc.cuny.edu/studies/ 
key_findings.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). In contrast, during the same period the number 
of individuals identifying themselves as members of a Christian sect only grew approximately 
five percent, and the number identifying themselves as Jews actually went down approximately 
ten percent. Id. 
4GEY-FIN 10/13/2004 7:33 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2004 
1018 
 
that Christianity will dominate the culture for the indefinite future,37 
the ground is shifting in unpredictable ways. Consequently, the 
move toward encouraging the use of shared “Abrahamic” religious 
values as the focal point of a religious and political cultural unity38 is 
really part of a common effort to fend off the encroachments of 
cultural secularism and avoid the ensuing clash with Islam by 
encouraging the development of moderate Western versions of the 
faith that will be more accommodating toward the traditionally 
dominant Western sects. 
The point is that none of this is a recipe for using religion to 
achieve true political unity. Religious factionalism is no less evident 
today than it was in earlier periods. The only difference is that the 
new antagonists to the main Western faiths today—cultural 
secularism and radical Islam—are not just competing for adherents 
but are also set on redefining the world in ways that would 
undermine the entire theological structure in which traditional 
Western religions operate. Whether they admit it or not, proponents 
of religious unity are urging a system that would perpetuate their 
own religious dominance. When Justice Scalia talks of “the God 
whom [we] all worship and seek,” he is not talking about Vishnu or 
Ormazd; he is talking about the God that he and most other 
Western religious practitioners worship and seek. The national 
religious sentiment that we are all urged to embrace will have a 
distinctly Western—and for the time being, Christian—feel. This 
may not be as spiritually imperialistic as Justice Story’s notorious 
comment that the Constitution was intended to create a Christian 
(by which he really meant Protestant) nation.39 However, permitting 
 37. As of the year 2001, there were approximately 159 million Christians, 3 million 
Jews, and 1 million Muslims in the United States. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Abdulaziz Sachedina, Guidance or Governance? A Muslim Conception of 
“Two-Cities,” 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1079 (2000). 
  [The] Abrahamic [faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—share] traditions 
[that] are characteristically founded upon the scriptures that locate justice in history 
through community. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . The role of religion, then, is to foster norms, attitudes, and values that can 
enhance peaceful relations among different ethnic and religious communities. The 
norms like ‘your brothers in religion’ or ‘your equals in creation’ can serve as the 
founding principle of a civil society even today. 
Id. at 1086, 1097. 
 39. “The real object of the amendment was not to countenance much less advance 
Mahometanism [sic], or Judaism, or Infidelity, by prostrating Christianity, but to exclude all 
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the public sphere of government to embrace the same religious 
values that already dominate the culture in the private sphere may 
have the identical effect of excluding the many individual members 
of the population who do not belong to one of the dominant faiths, 
who belong to a Western sect that eschews conspicuous public 
exhortations of piety, or who are not religious at all. This is a very 
strange vision of “unity.” 
For what it is worth, the majority of the current Supreme Court 
recognizes this in at least half of its Establishment Clause opinions.40 
At the same time that the Court has been systematically dismantling 
the structure of Establishment Clause separationism in the financing 
area,41 it has repeatedly reaffirmed separationism in the symbolic 
endorsement context.42 At least in cases involving religion in the 
public schools, which comprise the overwhelming majority of cases 
involving governmental symbolic endorsement of religion, a six-
justice majority of the Court continues to resist the notion that the 
legislative majority may choose a set of religious values to serve as the 
leitmotif for the culture as a whole.43 Ironically, Justice Kennedy, 
who is also one of the five Justices seeking to abandon separationism 
in the financing context, authored one of the most vociferous 
statements of the separationist principle in the symbolic-endorsement 
context. In the middle portion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
majority in Lee v. Weisman,44 he specifically rejected the goal of a 
religiously based political unity: 
rivalry among Christian sects.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 728 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). 
 40. See supra note 2. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding 
unconstitutional a school board policy permitting prayer at a public high school football 
game). 
 43. See, e.g., id.; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a 
school board policy permitting prayer at a public high-school graduation ceremony); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a state statute permitting a moment of 
silence where the policy is intended to insert religion into the classroom); Stone v. Graham, 
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a state statute requiring the posting of a copy of 
the Ten Commandments in public-school classrooms); Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding unconstitutional a state statute requiring the reading of the 
Bible in public-school classrooms); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding 
unconstitutional a state statute requiring the recitation of prayer in public-school classrooms). 
 44. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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If common ground can be defined which permits once conflicting 
faiths to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and a 
morality which transcend human invention, the sense of 
community and purpose sought by all decent societies might be 
advanced. But though the First Amendment does not allow the 
government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, neither 
does it permit the government to undertake that task for itself.45 
Later in the opinion, Justice Kennedy explains why this is so: 
The explanation lies in the lesson of history that was and is the 
inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the 
hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of 
religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. A 
state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief 
and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is 
real, not imposed.46 
This, then, is the response to those who would argue that unity 
through religion is a defining characteristic of the national political 
character. In justifying government assertions of religious principle in 
response to national crises, William Marshall gives away the game 
when he asserts that the “constitutional value of secularism is in its 
instrumental role, not in its own orthodoxy,” because constitutional 
secularism is intended “to protect, and not to displace, our collective 
religiosity.”47 Both of the primary ideas asserted in this statement are 
wrong. The first inaccurate assertion is the notion that the country is 
defined by its “collective religiosity.” This is wrong because even if 
the majority of the country defines itself in this way, the majority is 
not “the collective.” The second inaccuracy is the assertion that 
constitutional secularism serves only the instrumental function of 
protecting religion. The constitutional principle of secularism exists 
to protect democracy, not religion. This is not to say that the 
constitutional principle of secularism is hostile to religion any more 
than democracy is hostile to any other set of beliefs, prejudices, or 
ideals that define the lives of the citizens who live within the 
boundaries of a country that is governed democratically. 
Perhaps the central underlying problem with the claim of unity 
through religion is that the claim depends on the attainment of a 
 45. Id. at 589. 
 46. Id. at 591–92. 
 47. Marshall, supra note 12, at 33. 
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world that will never exist—that is, a world in which we all agree at 
the most fundamental level about the most basic issues of life, death, 
and meaning. These are the sorts of issues that religion (at least any 
religion worth discussing) addresses, and the claim that religious 
unity is possible implicitly asserts that agreement about these 
fundamental questions can be achieved. The possibility that any such 
agreement can occur in a community of any size is sheer fantasy, and 
any effort to achieve such agreement will lead inevitably to 
totalitarianism. This is why democratic theory sets a different goal for 
itself, essentially constructing a society in which these issues can be 
addressed by individual citizens on their own terms, and without fear 
of collective coercion or retribution. There are two paths to this 
narrower, but infinitely more desirable form of political unity. The 
next two sections sketch the outlines of the two ways in which unity 
under a secular constitution can be justified. 
IV. REAL UNITY AND THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM 
The pursuit of unity is a precarious objective in a democracy. 
Some forms of unity are not only permissible but actually necessary 
for democratic governance. For example, to prevent ordinary 
disputes over policy decisions from deteriorating into civil war, there 
must be unity among the population with regard to the need to lose 
political conflicts gracefully and to respect the legal validity of 
policies made by one’s victorious opponents. Other forms of unity, 
however, effectively impose an ideological orthodoxy that undercuts 
the pluralistic prerequisites of democratic government. Religious 
unity falls into the latter category. The pursuit of national unity 
through religious values assumes a comprehensive unity of purpose 
that affirms an identifiable set of fundamental values. This sort of 
unity is incompatible with democracy because it eschews the 
ideological agnosticism that is the primary prerequisite for long-term 
democratic governance.48 
To insist that democratic government is “agnostic” is not to say 
that democracy is unprincipled. On the contrary, democratic 
governance can only endure by adhering to certain core principles. 
 48. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 610 (1989) (“A secular state, it 
must be remembered, is not the same as an atheistic or antireligious state. A secular state 
establishes neither atheism nor religion as its official creed.”). 
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The principles that form the core of a constitutional democracy are 
essentially the principles of skepticism and constant ideological 
evolution, the recognition of which prevents the government from 
ever enshrining in law any particular set of fundamental values to the 
exclusion of any other set of values. There is a certain innate irony to 
this conception of democracy, in that it requires a democratic 
government to tolerate the existence and expression of even the 
most antidemocratic values among its citizens, even though it is clear 
that if those antidemocratic citizens gain power (even through 
democratic means) and establish their values as law, then that 
government will cease to be a democracy. 
This is relevant to the issue of religious unity because the very 
traits that define religion are precisely the opposite of those traits 
that define democracy; thus the acceptance of a regime that seeks to 
achieve a national unity of purpose through the collective acceptance 
of a religious ideal will constitute an abandonment of democracy. To 
briefly elaborate on this point, a democratic political structure is 
defined by three primary characteristics: popular control of the 
government, the tentative nature of all political decisions, and the 
idea that policies should be susceptible to rational critique and 
empirical analysis. The first characteristic of a democratic 
government is popular control of government. This characteristic is 
virtually the operational definition of a democracy. The precise 
mechanisms for exercising popular control can vary among different 
types of democratic governments. The proportional representation 
systems used by many European governments are no less democratic 
than the multiple-district, winner-take-all system prevalent in the 
United States and Britain. The first principle simply requires that the 
political structure reflect, in some reasonable way, the policy 
preferences of the dominant forces in society. 
Any combination of religion and government violates the first 
principle because it has the effect of subordinating popular control to 
the supernatural agency of God. This conclusion applies to all three 
major instances of governmental religious establishment: when the 
government endorses religion, when the government adopts a 
religious precept as law, or when government uses public funds to 
finance religious activities. In all three instances the government 
essentially delegates popular rule to policies dictated by a 
supernatural being whose decisions are outside human control. The 
need for something like the Lemon v. Kurtzman secular-purpose 
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requirement49 is crucial here, because even in situations in which 
religious policies are adopted by a majority of the electorate, the 
supporters of such policies would acknowledge that they are not 
acting on their own behalf, but on behalf of a Supreme Being—an 
example of political delegation that is unacceptable in a temporal 
democracy. 
The second characteristic of democracy is the tentative nature of 
all political decisions. This principle follows from the first because as 
political majorities change, so will the political policies supported by 
those majorities. Democracy is a long-term process, not a one-time-
only vote. This is the easy answer to the countermajoritarian 
difficulty that tends to absorb so much time in first-year 
constitutional law classes.50 The countermajoritarian role of courts in 
protecting political minorities is compatible with a democratic 
process that is defined by majoritarian control of political power 
because today’s minority might be tomorrow’s majority. By 
protecting political minorities and the expression of minority political 
sentiments today, the courts are thereby protecting the long-term 
survival of a vivid and flexible system of majority rule. In the end, 
this means that all policies are presumptively temporary, and the 
government may not enshrine any policy or principle as 
unquestioned or sacrosanct. Religious principles cannot satisfy this 
temporality requirement of democracy because religious principles 
are eternal, unassailable, unchanging, and unchangeable. 
The third principle of democracy is that political policies should 
be based on rationales that are susceptible to rational critique and 
empirical analysis. This is another way of articulating a similar point 
made by John Rawls,51 Robert Audi,52 and Richard Rorty53 to the 
effect that political decisions in a democracy should be based on 
rationales that are accessible to the entire political culture. All 
arguments regarding policy should therefore (to use Rawls’s 
 49. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (requiring all statutes to have a 
“secular legislative purpose”). 
 50. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (“The 
root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”). 
 51. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM (1993). 
 52. See ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000). 
 53. See RICHARD RORTY, Religion as Conversation-Stopper, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
SOCIAL HOPE 168, 172 (1999). 
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terminology) be cast in terms of public reason, which means they 
should be defended on terms that are perceived as reasonable even to 
people whose worldviews are based on irreconcilable ultimate 
beliefs.54 Political policies that are based primarily or exclusively on 
religious rationales cannot satisfy this reciprocity requirement.55 
Political policies that are based on the dictates of God cannot be 
justified on grounds accessible to those who worship a different God, 
who view God in a different way, or who do not believe in God at 
all. Political debate in a system that permits the infusion of sectarian 
principles into law thus becomes a battle over whose Supreme Being 
controls. 
As these three criteria for democratic governance indicate, a 
political system set up under these principles will be able to achieve 
political unity in the form of a government that enacts policies that 
can be justified on equally accessible grounds to everyone in society 
and that will allow for the possibility of political change—including 
change in the democratic nature of the system itself. What I have 
described here is merely one form of government among many other 
options. This is not intended to be a claim that the democratic form 
of government is inherently superior to all others (although I 
personally think it is), but rather that this is a roughly accurate 
description of the regime established by the United States 
Constitution. It is not implausible to reject democracy in favor of 
other political arrangements, including various types of theocratic 
governance, but it is impossible to reject these three basic principles 
without abandoning democracy. If this claim is true, then a system 
that adopts religious principles to guide the quest for national unity 
must be viewed as having abandoned the democratic commitment 
that supposedly was the reason the quest was initiated in the first 
place. 
As noted above, resistance to the adoption of secular democratic 
principles by those seeking to embrace some form of religious 
political unity is based primarily on the contention that these secular 
principles have the effect of skewing the system against religious 
practitioners and the beliefs that form the core of their spiritual lives. 
 54. See RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra 
note 51, at 131–32. 
 55. Thus, the Establishment Clause permits the government to adopt only those policies 
that can be justified in secular terms and are accessible and acceptable to both religious 
adherents and nonadherents.  
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The argument is that secular democracy ostracizes religious believers 
and devalues their beliefs. In Stephen Carter’s version of this 
argument, when the secular Constitution privatizes religious faith it 
forces believers to treat their religion as a “hobby,” not something to 
be taken as seriously as the secular ideas that form the basis of law 
and public life.56 Graham Walker even argues that this in essence 
creates a secular establishment: “Not only does this force religious 
citizens to truncate their identities, but it gives a special public 
advantage to those who embrace in their persons the principle of the 
polity, that is, to secularists.”57 
The answer to these complaints lies in the secular Constitution’s 
unwavering protection of a vibrant private sector, coupled with 
multiple protections from government control over activities within 
that sector. Privatizing religion does not, as Carter claims, ostracize 
or devalue religious belief; rather, by privatizing religion secular 
government protects religion by allowing it to grow free of 
government control and free of domination by each group’s religious 
antagonists. If the secular Constitution does not allow even 
dominant and powerful religions to use their private power to 
incorporate their religious views into law as the defining principles of 
cultural unity, then that is simply because other, weaker religious 
groups—as well as the nonreligious—also deserve protection from 
their more powerful adversaries. Religious groups can continue to 
practice their faith unless doing so will harm their neighbors or 
impose their values on unwilling fellow citizens. Members of 
religious groups can decide not to abort nonviable fetuses, but they 
cannot force that choice on others who have a different view of 
ensoulment. Likewise, religious children can pray in public school 
study halls and classrooms, so long as their parents do not insist that 
the State use its power to force other students to do the same. And 
under a proper rendering of a secular democracy (Zelman’s contrary 
holding58 notwithstanding), religious parents can send their children 
to private religious schools, so long as they do not force their 
neighbors to pay the tuition. 
 56. See Stephen L. Carter, Evolution, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 977. 
 57. Graham Walker, Illusory Pluralism, Inexorable Establishment, in OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 111, 111–12 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1987). 
 58. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a Cleveland, 
Ohio, school voucher program that provided financial benefits to private religious schools). 
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Under a regime of secular democracy, religious groups can even 
militate to replace the secular democracy with an undemocratic 
theocracy—at least up to the point that their militancy becomes a 
direct incitement to imminent revolution.59 But if they want to play 
by democracy’s rules, religious groups should not be able to write 
their principles into law, unless those principles can be justified in 
secular terms that are accessible and acceptable to nonadherents.60 
Likewise, religious adherents cannot make their chosen theology the 
focal point of crusades for national unity. In the context of the 
current controversy, sinners, atheists, transgressors, and apostates are 
Americans too, even in times of crisis, and the quest for national 
unity must treat them with the same respect as the most 
sanctimonious politician bowing ostentatiously in public prayer. 
V. REAL UNITY AND THE NEGATIVE CASE FOR  
CONSTITUTIONAL SECULARISM 
The affirmative case for constitutional secularism proceeds from 
the assumption that there is positive value in a democratic system in 
which everyone may participate in political decision making, but in 
which even political losers may retreat into loyal opposition in the 
private sector without fear of civil sanctions, imprisonment, or worse. 
This affirmative case seems insufficient for many of those seeking to 
introduce their religious values into the public sphere and thereby to 
enforce their God’s commands as law. The security of the private 
sector provided by secular democratic regimes will never suffice for 
any religious group that seeks to dominate the culture and define 
that culture through the group’s own perspective on the word of 
God. For any group such as this, there must be another, more 
convincing argument for secular democracy that does not rely on 
notions of political reciprocity, guarantees of equal political 
participation, and participation in an open and vibrant private sector. 
For such a group the argument for democracy must take a negative 
form; in other words, the case for democracy must be made in 
comparative terms as the lesser of alternative evils. The negative case 
for democracy therefore must be made through appeals to fear. 
Secular democracy may not give you everything you want, democrats 
 59. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 60. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
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must say to reluctant religious advocates, but it’s better than what 
you could suffer under alternative regimes. 
This is the Hobbesian case for a secular constitutional 
democracy. There is no reason to suspect that the basic human drive 
for dominance described by Hobbes does not also apply to humans 
who are motivated by religious conviction. Under this view, we can 
assume that religious activists are governed by the same urges as all 
other humans, toward the “perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power 
after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.”61 Thus, the same 
Hobbesian covenant that justifies political sovereignty generally62 
also justifies the grant of political authority to secular officials such as 
judges, who enforce the voluntary renunciation of power to enact 
and enforce religious dictates as law. This, as Hobbes puts it, is the 
real “[u]nitie of them all”63—that is, a unity based on fear and the 
desire for self-preservation. Such fear results in what Kathleen 
Sullivan has termed the “social contract produced by religious 
truce.”64 
The case presented to skeptical proponents of religious unity is 
basically this: at least if you lose the battle for power in a secular 
democracy, the winners will not be allowed to kill you, exile you, 
take your property, or confiscate your printing press. These are not 
small consolations. In a system without protections such as those 
offered by the First Amendment, the battle for power is crucial 
because the battle for power is also the battle for survival. Surely 
anyone who has witnessed the bloody history of the latter part of the 
twentieth century is familiar with the religious variation on this 
phenomenon.65 
 61. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 49 (Everyman ed. 1973) (1924). 
 62. Hobbes wrote: 
This is more than Consent or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all . . . 
as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right 
of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this 
condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions 
in like manner. 
 Id. at 89. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 
197 (1992). 
 65. Any in-depth exploration of the details of recent religious wars is both impossible in 
this context and also unnecessary for anyone who routinely peruses a daily newspaper. For a 
journalistic introduction and overview of the situation, which reviews recent religious conflicts 
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It is true, as Stephen Carter, Michael McConnell, and others 
argue,66 that political actors with a specifically religious agenda are 
treated differently than other political actors because those religious 
actors are told from the outset that they may not enact certain of 
their preferred policies into law. But religious political actors are not 
alone in this regard. The Constitution tells many different political 
actors that their deeply held convictions are not acceptable as law. 
Members of the Ku Klux Klan may run for political office, but they 
may not enact into law their most cherished discriminatory policies. 
Strong proponents of retributive capital punishment may become 
governors and even presidents, but they will not be permitted to 
execute robbers or rapists.67 The nature of a constitutional 
democracy is such that some issues are taken off the political table, 
and the quid pro quo for this limitation is that all groups, no matter 
how unpopular, may continue to ply their wares in the private sector. 
With this comes the possibility that such groups might muster 
enough support to eventually convince a sufficient number of 
citizens to renounce the constraints of secular democracy for a 
system with more certainty and less freedom. 
Religious groups may not be completely comfortable with the 
constraints imposed by the Establishment Clause, but they should 
acknowledge it as the constitutional equivalent of the old Cold-War 
theory of mutually assured destruction. Remove the constraints of 
the Establishment Clause, and no one can predict the results. 
Kathleen Sullivan summed up the negative case for the 
Establishment Clause nicely: 
[T]he exclusion of religion from public programs is not, as 
McConnell would have it, an invidious “preference for the secular 
in public affairs.” Secular governance of public affairs is simply an 
entailment of the settlement by the Establishment Clause of the 
war of all sects against all. From the perspective of the prepolitical 
war of all sects against all, the exclusion of any religion from public 
affairs looks like “discrimination.” But from the perspective of the 
in twenty-eight different countries, see JAMES A. HAUGHT, HOLY HATRED: RELIGIOUS 
CONFLICTS OF THE ’90S (1995). 
 66. See, e.g., supra notes 16–17, 56. 
 67. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that it is unconstitutional to 
impose the death sentence for the crime of rape). 
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settlement worked by the Establishment Clause, it looks like proper 
treatment.68 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Proponents of a religious form of national unity are fooling 
themselves. If we ever achieve unity through religion it will be a false 
unity, a unity of coercion and intolerance and mandatory obeisance 
to the God representing influential and politically dominant religious 
groups. Efforts to achieve religious unity fall victim to the universal 
God fallacy articulated by Justice Scalia in the graduation prayer 
case.69 Unity of this sort can never be achieved because Justice Scalia 
is simply wrong: there is no such thing as a “God whom [we] all 
worship and seek.”70 We do not all worship God, and the God some 
of us worship is different from the gods others venerate. But many of 
us do worship the same God, and those of us who do control most 
of the political power in this country. So even if a kind of unity could 
be achieved and the courts would allow it, some of us would have to 
be dragged to the chapel. And if history is any indication, such 
efforts to compel unity will inevitably fail in the long run, and maybe 
violently so.71 Compelling spiritual or political harmony is always 
futile, as Justice Jackson so eloquently reminded us half a century 
ago during another time of religious and patriotic fervor. Now, as 
then, “[c]ompulsory unification of opinion achieves only the 








 68. Sullivan, supra note 64, at 198–99 (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Religious 
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 169 (1992)). 
 69.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. 
 71. For an in-depth exploration of the complex interrelationship of religion, cultural 
identity, politics, and violence in the Indian context, see SUDHIR KAKAR, THE COLORS OF 
VIOLENCE: CULTURAL IDENTITIES, RELIGION, AND CONFLICT (1996). 
 72. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
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